





Instant Loans to Consumers*2
1. Introduction
This article deals with the Norwegian legal framework concerning non-secured ‘instant’ loans to consum-
ers. The loans are ‘instant’ because the procedure of applying for and granting them is meant to be fast and 
uncomplicated, often so as to make the money available the same day as the loan is applied for, or just a few 
days later. There is no requirement of a mortgage, surety, or other security right. The loan is not granted 
for a specifi c purpose. The business idea is obviously to offer access to cash rather informally and on short 
notice; the term ‘easy loan’ is often used in advertising on the Internet. In Norwegian, such loans are often 
called forbrukslån, literally ‘loans for consumption’.
Non-secured instant loans to consumers are offered by several actors in Norway. The most important 
lenders seem to be banks, providing loans either directly or through intermediaries. Those offering credit 
services to Norwegian customers (whether banks, other fi nancial institutions, or even businesses estab-
lished abroad) are subject to public licence and supervision requirements (see Section 2). In practice, there 
are likely to be few cases of credit granted to consumers living in Norway by institutions not established 
in Norway and not offering their services here (the consumer thus having actively contacted the lender 
abroad); no statistical information is available, however.
Advertising indicates that the following example is representative.*3 The consumer may borrow 
between NOK 5,000 and NOK 400,000 (EUR 625–50,000). The effective annual percentage rate (APR) 
varies between 9.59 and 21.24 per cent and the initial rate depends on the borrower’s ‘fi nancial situation’. 
The amortisation period is, at maximum, 15 years. The borrower may repay the loan at any time at no extra 
cost, as the interest rate is variable. The borrower must be a Norwegian citizen, have an income, and have 
no active debt collection actions against him.
There is one provider of even smaller instant loans, Folkia AS.*4 For such loans the relative costs are 
higher; a loan of NOK 1000 (EUR 125) for one month, for example, has a staggering APR of 9242 per cent, 
due not least to NOK 350 (EUR 44) of set-up charges. Folkia AS is a rather small actor in the Norwegian 
credit market but the business concept has naturally drawn some public attention.
Alternatives to the loans described above are overdraft facilities and credit cards, both of which are 
rather common. Credit costs are regularly quite high for these alternatives as well.
1 The author would like to thank Katherine Llorca for her text editing.
2 The research leading to these results has received funding from the Norway Financial Mechanism 2009–2014 under project 
contract No. EMP205.
3 From Bank Norwegian AS (www.banknorwegian.no, most recently accessed on 7 February 2014). For other examples, see 
DnB (www.dnb.no, most recently accessed on 7 February 2014); Santander Consumer Bank (www.santander.no, most 
recently accessed on 7.22014); GE Money Bank Norge (www.gemoney.no, most recently accessed on 7.2.2014).
 4 See folkia.no (most recently accessed on 7.2.2014).
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For the sake of completeness and in order to paint a clearer picture of the market, it should be men-
tioned that credit for unspecifi ed purposes may also easily be obtained in the form of credit secured under 
a previously-established mortgage—typically a mortgage on the consumer’s home—in the form of either 
a draft facility or a fi xed loan. This requires a little more paperwork but is usually less expensive than the 
loans just described. Consumer mortgages are mostly provided by banks, and a new loan secured under 
the mortgage will typically be provided by the same bank. A loan from another bank, secured by a second 
mortgage, can serve the same purposes.
Household debt is high in Norway. Home loans and an expensive property market are the main reasons 
for this, and ‘loans for consumption’ make up just a small proportion (less than three per cent) of total 
household debt.*5 On the other hand, such loans are much more commonly the object of debt settlement 
and debt collection cases against consumers (see Section 3, below).
2. Licensing, supervision, and marketing
2.1. Licensing and supervision
Providing credit and acting as an intermediary for the provision of credit are examples of ‘fi nancial services’, 
and fi nancial services may only be offered by—among others—banks and fi nance companies licensed under 
the Financial Institutions Act.*6 Norwegian businesses of this kind are subject to supervision by the Finan-
cial Supervisory Authority of Norway.*7
Norway is a party to the Agreement on the European Economic Area (EEA). This agreement includes 
rules on the four freedoms corresponding to the rules of the treaties of the European Union, and much of 
the secondary EU legislation, including legislation on fi nancial markets, has been made binding on non-EU 
members of the EEA. As a result, credit institutions licensed and supervised in another EEA member state 
are allowed to offer fi nancial services in Norway.*8 Branches of such credit institutions need a licence under 
Norwegian law.*9 The provision of fi nancial services by foreign credit institutions (cross-border services) is 
subject to supervision by the Financial Supervisory Authority of Norway and so are the activities of Norwe-
gian branches of foreign credit institutions.*10
These rules on licence requirements and on supervision are stricter in Norway than in many other 
countries. Licence requirements and supervision probably contribute considerably to compliance with con-
sumer protection rules, as the loss of one’s licence—or a warning that it may be lost—is a more effi cient 
enforcement tool than available civil law remedies.
There are general rules in the Financial Institutions Act and related regulations concerning the 
 organisation, capital, etc. of institutions offering fi nancial services.
2.2. Requirements regarding marketing and conduct of business
Chapter 3 of the Financial Contracts Act deals with credit contracts.*11 The scope of the chapter is somewhat 
wider than the title indicates. Some of the rules concern the contractual relationship between lender and 
borrower, addressing the conclusion and validity of the contract, mandatory rules on the content of the 
contract, etc. Other rules primarily concern the marketing of credit contracts and the lender’s informa-
tion duties. The latter are mainly rules of conduct, and violation of these rules may ultimately have conse-
quences for the lender’s licence to act as a fi nancial institution. In addition, the Consumer Ombudsman and 
the Market Council are authorised to take measures against unfair commercial practices and unfair contract 
5 Finanstilsynet, Finansielt utsyn 2014 [‘Risk Outlook 2014: The Financial Market in Norway’], Oslo 2014, pp. 24–25.
6 Lov 40/1988 om fi nansieringsvirksomhet og fi nansinstitusjoner (Financial Institutions Act), Sections 1-2 and 1-4. Some 
narrow exceptions for credit sales and for occasional credit are of little interest and will not be dealt with here.
7 Lov 7. desember 1956 nr. 1 om tilsynet med fi nansinstitusjoner mv. (Financial Supervision Act), Section 1.
8  Financial Institutions Act, Section 1-4, No. 4.
9 Financial Institutions Act, Section 3-3.
10 Administrative regulation 717/1994, Section 9 and administrative regulation 326/1994, Section 11.
11 Lov 46/1999 om fi nansavtaler og fi nansoppdrag (Financial Contracts Act).
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terms. The basis of this control can be found in both the Financial Contracts Act and the Marketing Act.*12 
Some of the rules have a double edge and a violation may have consequences both in contract law and in 
public law; for example, a breach of information duties may both affect the contractual relationship and at 
the same time lead to reactions from the Financial Supervisory Authority or the Consumer Ombudsman 
and the Market Council. In addition to the rules in the Financial Contracts Act (see below), general rules on 
marketing apply, such as restrictions on sales or marketing by telephone etc.
Directive 2008/48/EC, on consumer credit agreements, is transposed through Chapter 3 of the Finan-
cial Contracts Act. The rules corresponding to the rules of the Directive on pre-contractual information and 
on information that must be included in the credit contract will not be dealt with in detail here.
Marketing of credit contracts must include information on the borrowing rate, the total amount of 
credit, APR, etc., specifi ed by means of a representative example.*13 A glance at some Web pages indicates 
that lenders generally comply with these requirements. Some of the Web pages even include loan calcula-
tors, illustrating how costs vary with the loan amount and the credit period.
More specifi c information on the credit contract in question must be given ‘in good time’ and before the 
consumer is bound by the contract.*14 To give such information ‘in good time’ when the business concept is 
instant credit may seem like a contradiction in terms. Most likely, the information is given by e-mail, so the 
consumer must decide for himself how much time is needed to study it.
The lender must also provide ‘adequate explanations’, enabling the consumer to ‘assess whether the 
proposed credit agreement is adapted to his needs and to his fi nancial situation’.*15 At least for the smallest 
loans, it seems more or less impossible to offer individual explanations of this kind; the administrative costs 
would be too high. Directive 2008/48 (Art. 5(6)) allows Member States to adapt this rule to the circum-
stances, but no such adaptations have been made in Norway. Regarding this rule, compliance may turn out 
to be questionable for providers of the loans here discussed.
The lender must assess the consumer’s creditworthiness, if necessary by consulting a relevant database.*16 
To date (February 2014), no relevant database or register (positive or negative) has been established in Nor-
way. A proposal for legislation on a consumer debt register was submitted to Parliament in September 2013 
but was subsequently withdrawn by the new government in November 2013, before it had been discussed at 
all in the Parliament; the new government wanted to re-evaluate ‘some elements of the proposal’.*17
Today, assessment of a consumer’s creditworthiness is based on an enquiry submitted to a credit ref-
erence agency, in addition to confi rmation of employment. Credit reference enquiries can be carried out 
online; the consumer receives a paper copy of the answer a few days later. The agency will often report pre-
vious income and property, based on public information from tax authorities, the Land Registry, etc. and, 
where necessary, recent debt collection actions against the consumer. Credit reference agencies are private 
businesses and need a licence from the Norwegian Data Protection Agency. Rules of conduct are imposed 
by the licence. In February 2014, nine licences were active.*18
Under the Financial Contracts Act, Section 47, the lender has a duty to warn the consumer if the lender 
could not have been unaware of the fact that the consumer, because of his fi nancial situation or other cir-
cumstances, should seriously consider foregoing the loan. The warning (literally ‘dissuasion’) must be given 
in writing and, if possible, also orally if the contract has not yet been concluded. A breach of the lender’s 
duty to warn may lead to an adjustment of the consumer’s obligations under the contract if that is deemed 
reasonable by a court.
The duty to warn the consumer goes further than the information duties under Directive 2008/48. 
The Norwegian government held that the lender’s duty to warn was based on general principles of loyalty 
in contractual relationships and thus was not contrary to total harmonisation as envisaged by Directive 
2008/48. The government also referred to remarks in the preamble to the directive (paragraph 26 in the 
12 Lov 2/2009 om kontroll med markedsføring og avtalevilkår mv. (Marketing Act); this Act is also a transposition of Direc-
tive 2005/29/EC, on unfair commercial practices.
13 Directive 2008/48, Art. 4; Financial Contracts Act, Section 46.
14 Directive 2008/48, Art. 5; Financial Contracts Act, Section 46 a.
15 Directive 2008/48, Art. 5(6); Financial Contracts Act, Section 46 c.
16 Directive 2008/48, Art. 6; Financial Contracts Act, Section 46 b.
17 Prop. 195 L (2012–2013), Endringer i tinglysingsloven mv. (registrering av gjeld) (the Government’s proposal to the Parlia-
ment); Meld. St. 17 (2013–2014), Tilbaketrekning av Prop. 195 L (2012–2013), Endringer i tinglysingsloven mv. (registrering 
av gjeld) (the Government’s white paper to the Parliament).
18 See www.datatilsynet.no (most recently accessed on 12.4.2014).
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fi nal version) on responsible lending.*19 Responsible lending duties did not become incorporated into the 
fi nal version of the directive.
Adjustment of the consumer’s obligations due to lack of warning under the provision in Section 47 of 
the Financial Contracts Act has not yet been invoked successfully before the Norwegian Supreme Court 
(and, in total, it has been invoked in only three cases).*20 The consumer’s obligations have been adjusted 
in a few cases by the Financial Complaints Panel (Finansklagenemnda), but the consumer has lost in 
most cases.*21 So far, it seems fair to say that the duty to warn the consumer is a frail consumer protection 
instrument.
3. Consumer insolvency
Legislation concerning debt settlement for private individuals was introduced in Norway in 1992.*22 This 
legislation aims to give persons with serious debt problems the possibility to regain control over their fi nan-
cial situation.
Under the Debt Settlement Act, a debtor may apply to the local Enforcement Offi cer for the opening 
of a protected period of negotiations with creditors. The Enforcement Offi cer has an important role in the 
civil enforcement system, and his decisions may be appealed to the local court of fi rst instance. Negotiations 
are opened if the criterion of serious debt problems is met, the applicant is willing to co-operate, and debt 
settlement would not be considered ‘offensive’ for the reasons specifi ed in the Act. There is a debt morato-
rium during the negotiation period.
Debt settlement is either voluntary or compulsory. The settlement is voluntary if the debtor’s proposal 
is not opposed by any creditor. If negotiations for a voluntary settlement fail, a compulsory settlement may 
be decided on by the court. The proportion of voluntary settlements has increased and now amounts to 
around 80 per cent of all debt settlements.*23
To obtain a settlement, the debtor must—as a rule—sell assets that are not needed for a minimum stan-
dard of life. Further, the debtor must agree to use any income exceeding a fi xed minimum as a dividend to 
his creditors for a period of normally fi ve years. If the settlement is fulfi lled, the debtor is then discharged 
(with some exceptions for secured loans, etc.).
Today, it is accepted that debt settlement may be decided on without any dividend at all for the credi-
tors. Such ‘zero settlements’ now amount to around 60 per cent of the total number of settlements.*24 In 
these cases too, the settlement period is normally fi ve years. The high number of ‘zero settlements’ indicates 
that the debt settlement regime is particularly important for persons without normal employment.
The total number of settlements of debt is not high—68 negotiations opened per 100,000 inhabitants of 
Norway in 2011. The total number of debt settlements peaked in 2011 and has not decreased much in 2012 
and 2013. In Oslo, the number has increased in the same period.*25
From a comparative perspective*26, the relatively high number of voluntary settlements and ‘zero settle-
ments’ is quite interesting.
It seems that ‘loans for consumption’ account for larger share of the total debt in typical debt settle-
ments than they used to, some years ago.*27 Of the total number of debt collection cases against consumers, 
13 per cent are related to loans for consumption.*28
19 Ot.prp. nr. 22 (2007–2008), p. 40 (the Government’s proposal to the Parliament). 
20 Norsk Retstidende (Rt.) 2003, p. 1252; Rt. 2004, p. 156; Rt. 2013, p. 388.
21 See, for example, FINKN-2011-577 and FINKN-2011-274. 
22 Lov 99/1992 om frivillig og tvungen gjeldsordning for privatpersoner (Debt Settlement Act).
23 Statistics made available by the Ministry of Children, Equality and Social Inclusion (February 2014). See also C. Poppe, 
R. Lavik, Hvorfor øker antall gjeldsordningssaker i Oslo? [‘Why is the number of debt settlement cases increasing in Oslo?’]. 
Oslo: Statens institutt for forbruksforskning 2013, pp. 32–33.
24 Statistics made available by the Ministry of Children, Equality and Social Inclusion (February 2014).
25 See C. Poppe, R. Lavik (Note 22), pp. 9–13. Statistics made available by the Ministry of Children, Equality and Social Inclu-
sion (February 2014).
26 For international comparisons, see, for example, J. Spooner. ‘Fresh start or stalemate? European consumer insolvency law 
reform and the politics of household debt. – European Review of Private Law 21 (2013)/3, pp. 747–794. Insolvency and Credi-
tor/Debtor Regimes Task Force (World Bank, Working Group on the Treatment of the Insolvency of Natural Persons), 2013.
27 See C. Poppe, R. Lavik (Note 22), pp. 51–56.
28 Prop. 195 L (2012–2013), 21.
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Municipalities have a duty to assist—‘as far as possible’—persons trying to obtain debt settlements 
under the Debt Settlement Act, and the municipalities also have general duties to give advice under legisla-
tion on social services.*29 The availability of such assistance and advice seems to vary quite a lot from one 
area to another.
A survey done in January 2014 showed that ‘loans for consumption’ led to 12.5 percent of the debt col-
lection cases (compared to two per cent for home loans). Small claims from mail order purchases, parking 
fi nes, etc. were the basis of the majority of debt collection cases.*30
4. Contract law
Credit contracts are regulated in the Financial Contracts Act in addition to general contract law—legislated 
and non-legislated.
A credit contract is not binding on the consumer unless it is ‘in writing’, but writing includes electronic 
means of concluding a contract as long as the content of the contract is available to the consumer at the 
time of conclusion and the conclusion of the contract is made authentic in a reliable manner.*31 The banks 
have developed a solution for electronic signatures, a solution that is applied both by banks and by other 
businesses offering the loans dealt with in this article. In this way, a credit contract can be validly concluded 
on the Internet.
Unfair marketing practices or breach of pre-contractual information duties does not automatically 
affect the contractual relationship but may, depending on the circumstances, lead to revision of the contract 
based on general contract law. Terms not included in the written contract are not binding on the consumer 
unless the lender proves that the term was accepted by the consumer.*32
It was explained under Subsection 2.2 above that breach of the duty to warn a consumer (where neces-
sary) about the risks of taking out a loan may lead to adjustment of the consumer’s obligations under the 
contract.
The consumer has a right to withdraw from the credit contract within 14 calendar days of signing or of 
receiving relevant information concerning the right of withdrawal, whichever is later.*33 If the consumer 
exercises his right to withdraw, he must repay the money received, with interest (at the nominal interest 
rate). The lender is not entitled to any other compensation except possible charges by a public administra-
tive body. These rules apply even to small loans, whereas Directive 2008/48 applies only to credit contracts 
involving a total amount of credit of at least EUR 200.*34 For the very short-term credit contracts, the right 
of withdrawal seems to offer the ‘cunning’ consumer an easy way out of paying set-up fees.
There are no provisions in the Financial Contracts Act on the maximum credit costs allowed. A provi-
sion in the Price Measures Act prohibiting ‘unreasonable’ prices is generally thought to have little impor-
tance in today’s liberal market economy.*35 The most relevant provision to apply in an assessment of poten-
tially excessive credit costs is Section 36 of the Formation of Contracts Act, the so-called general clause, 
common to all the Nordic countries.*36 This provision, with some small additions regarding non-negotiated 
terms, has been regarded as suffi cient transposition of Directive 93/13/EEC, on unfair contract terms in 
contracts with consumers.
The general clause has almost never been applied by Norwegian courts so as to adjust an agreed price 
or remuneration, at least not because the price was regarded as too high (in some cases regarding ground 
leases, the rent has been adjusted upwards in order to compensate for infl ation).*37 This is also in line with 
29 Debt Settlement Act, Section 1-5; Lov 131/2009 om sosiale tjenester i arbeids-og velferdsforvaltningen (Social Services 
Act), Section 17.
30 Finanstilsynet, Finansielt utsyn 2014 (see Note 4), p. 25.
31 Financial Contracts Act, Sections 8 and 48.
32 Financial Contracts Act, Section 48(4).
33 Financial Contracts Act, Section 51 b; cf. Directive 2008/48, Art. 14.
34 See Directive 2008/48, Art. 2(2)(c); cf. Preamble, para. 10.
35 Lov 66/1993 om pristiltak (Price Measures Act), Section 2. See also the Supreme Court judgment in Rt. 1996, p. 407.
36 Lov 31. mai 1918 nr. 4 om avslutning av avtaler, om fuldmagt og om ugyldige viljeserklæringer (Formation of Contracts 
Act), Section 36.
37 K. Lilleholt. Application of general principles in private law in the Nordic countries. – Juridica International 2013, pp. 12–19.
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Directive 93/13, Art. 4, which excludes from the unfairness test any balancing between the ‘main subject 
matter’ and the price.*38 Adjustment of the price is not entirely excluded under the general clause, but it 
should not normally be done unless there are elements of misleading information, fraud, or unfair exploi-
tation.*39
In private law, there are no rules dealing in particular with high interest rates. The notion of usury is 
not applied in contract law. The parallel in contract law to usury in criminal law is a provision on invalidity 
because of unfair exploitation. The provision is rarely applied nowadays.
Under the Late Payment Act, the interest rate in cases of late payment is fi xed at eight percentage points 
above the Norwegian Central Bank’s key policy rate, set every six months. The late payment interest rate 
currently (February 2014) stands at 9.75 per cent per year (no compound interest).*40 The rules are man-
datory where the debtor is a consumer and the parties cannot validly agree to additional penalties etc.*41 
However, the ordinary contractual interest rate may still be claimed by the creditor.*42 For the loans we are 
dealing with here, the contractual interest rate will often be the higher one, not least because it will normally 
include compound interest. A claim for late payment interest may be reduced if the consumer had a good 
reason not to pay—for example, where the obligation to pay was contested.*43 This rule is probably of scarce 
practical interest for loan contracts.
5. Criminal law
In criminal law, usury relates to unfair exploitation and not to the interest rate or other forms of remunera-
tion.*44 A provision on usury has not been included in the General Criminal Act 2005 (not yet in force); 
it was argued that the Price Measures Act (which also contains a penalty provision) was suffi cient.*45 In 
criminal law, cases on usury have also been rather rare, although, in a case from 2007, the Supreme Court 
pointed out that usury was obviously not of pure historical interest—the case dealt with blatant exploitation 
in criminal circles.*46 The situation in that case was not at all similar, however, to the regular offering of 
fast loans to consumers dealt with here. It seems fair to say that rules on usury in criminal law are of little 
interest in this fi eld.
6. Conclusions
Norway has, to date, been practically spared the consequences of the fi nancial crisis. Aside from the future 
negative effects of international markets, there is currently more concern about growing household debt 
and a potential housing bubble. Instant loans make up just a small share of household debt. These loans 
still create serious problems, however, for a vulnerable group of consumers, as is shown by the role of such 
loans in consumer debt settlements.
Arguably, the most effi cient consumer protection in this fi eld lies in licence and supervision require-
ments, which apply to all providers of credit, and in the Consumer Ombudsman’s control of marketing 
activities. The Financial Services Act regulates the relationship between lender and consumer, but the pro-
tection of the consumers’ rights through contractual remedies has proved diffi cult, both because it is slow 
and costly and because courts and tribunals have been rather reluctant in their application of consumer 
protection legislation.
38 See, though, some interesting comments by General Advocate Wahl in Case C-26/13.
39 See the Supreme Court Judgment in Rt. 1969, 664 regarding law prior to the general clause.
40 Lov 100/1976 om renter ved forsinket betaling m.m. (Late Payment Act), Section 3(1).
41 Late Payment Act, Section 4.
42 Late Payment Act, Section 3(2).
43 Late Payment Act, Section 4(a); see for example, the Appeal Court decision in LB-2011-36899.
44 Almindelig borgerlig straffelov 22. mai 1902 nr. 10 (General Criminal Act), Section 295. 
45 Ot.prp. nr. 22 (2008–2009) (the Government’s proposal to the Parliament), p. 386.
46 Rt. 2007, p. 583.
